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Abstract. Three-way decision theory, which trisects the universe with less risks or costs,
is considered as a powerful mathematical tool for handling uncertainty in incomplete and
imprecise information tables, and provides an effective tool for conflict analysis decision
making in real-time situations. In this paper, we propose the concepts of the agreement, dis-
agreement and neutral subsets of a strategy with two evaluation functions, which establish the
three-way decisions-based conflict analysis models(TWDCAMs) for trisecting the universe
of agents, and employ a pair of two-way decisions models to interpret the mechanism of the
three-way decision rules for an agent. Subsequently, we develop the concepts of the agree-
ment, disagreement and neutral strategies of an agent group with two evaluation functions,
which build the TWDCAMs for trisecting the universe of issues, and take a couple of two-
way decisions models to explain the mechanism of the three-way decision rules for an issue.
Finally, we reconstruct Fan, Qi and Wei’s conflict analysis models(FQWCAMs) and Sun, Ma
and Zhao’s conflict analysis models(SMZCAMs) with two evaluation functions, and interpret
FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs with a pair of two-day decisions models, which illustrates that
FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs are special cases of TWDCAMs.
Keywords: Conflict analysis; Rough sets; Situation tables; Three-way decisions
1 Introduction
Three-way decision theory [34], which promotes thinking and problem solving in threes such as three
regions, three levels and three stages, is regarded as one of leading theories for handling uncertainty
in decision making problems. The intrinsic ideas of three-way decision theory [2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 15, 18, 19,
30, 32, 33, 35, 38–40] have been widely applied to many fields such as medical decision-making and
recommender systems. Especially, it has had great success in building classifiers for classifying test
examples into three classes of acceptance, non-commitment and rejection. For example, Chen et al. [3]
∗Corresponding author.
E-mail address: langguangming1984@126.com(G.M.Lang).
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developed the three-way decision support method for handling the uncertain medical cases and achieved
precise classification of Malignant Focal Liver Lesions to support liver cancer diagnosis. Hu and Yao [11]
provided structured rough set approximations of sets for three-way decision making in both complete and
incomplete information tables. Luo et al. [18] investigated the update problems of three-way decisions
with dynamic variation of scales in incomplete multi-scale information systems. Yan et al. [30] employed
the difference in the cost of selecting key samples to construct a three-way decision ensemble model
for imbalanced data oversampling. Zhang, Min and Shi [40] established a regression-based three-way
recommender system and minimized the average cost by adjusting the thresholds for different behaviors.
Conflicts, as one of the most essential characteristic of human nature, exist extensively due to the
scarcity of resources and cultural diversity in social life, and conflict analysis and resolution, which ex-
plore the structure of conflicts for making proper decisions, play an important role in many fields such
as business, political and legal disputes and military operations. Especially, Pawlak [21] initially pro-
vided rough sets-based conflict analysis models which trisect the universe of agents with respect to an
issue set. Nowadays, researchers [1, 4–6, 8, 10, 12–14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 24–29, 37] have established more
conflict analysis models for decision making from different views. For example, Fan, Qi and Wei [8]
employed the including degree to construct a type of TWDCAMs over two universes and divided agents
and issues into three disjoint blocks with respect to a strategy and an agent group, respectively. Lang,
Miao and Cai [14] developed another type of TWDCAMs and studied how to divide agents into three
disjoint blocks in dynamic situation tables. Sun, Ma and Zhao [25] established rough sets-based conflict
analysis models over two universes and gave a convenient way to analyze and solve the conflict situation.
Furthermore, the existing conflict analysis models provide an effective tool for decision making problems
in conflict situations. Especially, we observe that FQWCAMs divide the universes of agents and issues
into three disjoint blocks with the including degree from the view of formal concepts; we also find that
SMZCAMs employ the set inclusion and intersection to trisect the universes of agents and issues from the
view of rough sets, and there are some similarities and differences between FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs,
but the existing results have not illustrated the intrinsic ideas of these conflict analysis models. Actually,
there are three values for the opinions of agents on issues in situation tables, which is consistent with the
intrinsic idea of three-way decisions, and it is very important to study FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs based
on three-way decision theory.
The purpose is to study further TWDCAMs. Firstly, we propose a type of TWDCAMs for trisecting
the universe of agents based on two evaluation functions. Concretely, we provide the concepts of an
acceptance evaluation and a rejection evaluation of a strategy by an agent. We propose the concepts of the
agreement, disagreement and neutral subsets of a strategy with the acceptance and rejection evaluations,
which are considered as the intrinsic idea of the TWDCAMs for trisecting the universe of agents. We
employ a pair of two-way decisions models to interpret TWDCAMs, FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs for
trisecting agents and find that FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs are special cases of this type of TWDCAMs.
2
Secondly, we develop another type of TWDCAMs for dividing the universe of issues into three disjoint
blocks. Concretely, we propose the concepts of an acceptance evaluation and a rejection evaluation of an
agent group by an issue. We introduce the concepts of the agreement, disagreement and neutral strategies
of an agent group with the acceptance and rejection evaluations, which are considered as the intrinsic
idea of TWDCAMs for trisecting the universe of issues. We also employ a pair of two-way decisions
models to interpret TWDCAMs, FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs for trisecting issues and find that this type
of TWDCAMs is a generalization of FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the concepts of rough sets and
three-way decisions. In Section 3, we provide TWDCAMs for dividing the universe of agents. Section
4 develops TWDCAMs for trisecting the universe of issues. In Section 5, we investigate the relationship
among TWDCAMs, FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the concepts of rough sets over two universes, three-way decisions,
and situation tables.
Suppose U and V are two universes, and R be a binary relation from U to V . If there exist t ∈ V and
s ∈ U such that (u, t), (s, v) ∈ R for any u ∈ U and v ∈ V , then R is called a compatibility relation. For any
x ∈ U, v ∈ V , the compatibility relation between x and v is a set-valued mapping R : U −→ 2V . That is,
R(x) = {v ∈ V | (x, v) ∈ R,∀x ∈ U}, where R(x) denotes all elements in V related with x.
Definition 2.1 [25] Let U and V be two universes, and R a compatibility relation from U to V. Then the
lower and upper approximations apr
R
(X) and aprR(X) of X ⊆ V are defined as follows:
apr
R
(X) = {x ∈ U | R(x) ⊆ X}, aprR(X) = {x ∈ U | R(x) ∩ X , ∅}.
The set apr
R
(X) consists of elements of U which are only compatible with those elements in X, and
the set aprR(X) consists of elements of U which are compatible with at least one element in X. That is,
the sets apr
R
(X) and aprR(X), which build the bridge between the universes U and V , are interpreted as
the pessimistic description and optimistic description of X, respectively.
Definition 2.2 [34] Let U be the universe of objects, V the universe of attributes, P(X|[x]B) = |[x]B∩X||[x]B |
for X ⊆ U and B ⊆ V, where [x]B = {y ∈ U | ∀c ∈ B, c(x) = c(y)}, c(x) and c(y) are attribute values of
objects x and y on the attribute c, and 0 ≤ β < α ≤ 1. Then the positive, boundary and negative regions
POS (α,β)(X), BND(α,β)(X) and NEG(α,β)(X) of X are defined as follows:
POS (α,β)(X) = {x ∈ U | P(X|[x]) ≥ α};
BND(α,β)(X) = {x ∈ U | β < P(X|[x]) < α};
NEG(α,β)(X) = {x ∈ U | P(X|[x]) ≤ β}.
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By Definition 2.2, we divide all objects into the positive, boundary and negative regions. Concretely,
for x ∈ U, if P(X|[x]) ≥ α, then x ∈ POS (α,β)(X); if β < P(X|[x]) < α, then x ∈ BND(α,β)(X); if P(X|[x]) ≤
β, then x ∈ NEG(α,β)(X). Furthermore, we derive different rules with the positive, boundary and negative
regions. Concretely, the positive region generates positive rules to make a decision of acceptance; the
negative region generates negative rules to make a decision of rejection; the third choice, generated from
the boundary regions, makes a decision of non-commitment.
Definition 2.3 [21] Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, the attitude of the agent
x ∈ U to an issue c ∈ V is interpreted as a function c : U −→ Vc, where Vc = {+1,−1, 0}, c(x) = +1means
the agent x agrees with the issue c, c(x) = −1 represents the agent x opposes the issue c, and c(x) = 0
represents the agent x is neutral towards the issue c.
For simplicity, we refer to (U,V) as a situation table in the following discussion. A situation table,
where all agents are measured by using a finite number of issues and all issue values are taken from
{+1, 0,−1}, represents the opinions of all agents to some issues. Furthermore, there are many basic re-
search directions for situation tables, and we only study how to trisect the universes of agents and issues
based on the three-way decisions theory in this work.
Example 2.4 [21] Table 1 depicts the situation for the Middle East, where U = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6} and
V = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}, where x1, x2, x3, x4, x5 and x6 are six agents, c1, c2, c3, c4 and c5 are five issues. For
example, c1(x1) = −1 denotes the agent x1 is against the issue c1, and c1(x2) = +1 denotes the agent x2
supports the issue c1, and c1(x4) = 0 denotes the agent x4 is neutral to the issue c1.
Table 1: The Situation Table for the Middle East.
U
V
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
x1 −1 +1 +1 +1 +1
x2 +1 0 −1 −1 −1
x3 +1 −1 −1 −1 0
x4 0 −1 +1 0 −1
x5 +1 −1 −1 −1 −1
x6 0 +1 −1 0 +1
Remark: In Table 1, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5 and x6 stands for Israel, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and
Saudi Arabia, respectively; c1 means Autonomous Palestinian state on theWest Bank and Gaza; c2 denotes
Israeli military outpost along the Jordan River; c3 stands for Israel retains East Jerusalem; c4 means Israeli
military outposts on the Golan Heights; c5 denotes Arab countries grant citizenship to Palestinians who
choose to remain within their borders.
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3 TWDCAMs for Trisecting the Universe of Agents
In this section, we study TWDCAMs for trisecting the universe of agents.
3.1 TWDCAMs I
In this section, we provide a type of TWDCAMs for dividing agents into three disjoint blocks.
Definition 3.1 Let U be the universe of agents, and V the universe of issues, (La,a) and (Lr,r) are two
posets. Then a pair of functions νa : U × P(V) → La and νr : U × P(V) → Lr is called an acceptance
evaluation and a rejection evaluation of a strategy by an agent, respectively.
For an agent x ∈ U and a strategy X ⊆ V , we refer to νa(x, X) and νr(x, X) as the acceptance and
rejection degrees of the strategy X by the agent x, respectively; for the agents x, y ∈ U, if νa(x, X) a
νa(y, X), then x is less acceptable than y with respect to X; for the agents x, y ∈ U, if νr(x, X) r νr(y, X),
then x is less rejectable than y with respect to X. Furthermore, if the agent x accepts the strategy X, then
νa(x, X) must be in a certain subset L
+
a ⊆ La, where L+a stands for the acceptance region of La; if the agent
x rejects the strategy X, then νr(x, X) must be in a certain subset L
−
r ⊆ Lr, where L−r denotes the rejection
region of Lr. For simplicity, L
+
a and L
+
r denote the designated values for acceptance and designed values
for rejection, respectively, in the following.
Definition 3.2 Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, L+a and L
+
r the designated val-
ues for acceptance and designed values for rejection, respectively, νa and νr the acceptance evaluation
and rejection evaluation of an agent to a strategy, respectively, and X ⊆ V a strategy. Then we define
the agreement, disagreement and neutral subsets POS (νa,νr)(X),NEG(νa,νr)(X) and BND(νa,νr)(X) of X as
follows:
POS (νa,νr)(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) ∈ L+a ∧ νr(x, X) < L−r };
NEG(νa,νr)(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) < L+a ∧ νr(x, X) ∈ L−r };
BND(νa,νr)(X) = (POS (νa,νr)(X) ∪ NEG(νa,νr)(X))C
= {x ∈ U | (νa(x, X) < L+a ∧ νr(x, X) < L−r ) ∨ (νa(x, X) ∈ L+a ∧ νr(x, X) ∈ L−r )}.
For an agent x ∈ U and a strategy X ⊆ V , if νa(x, X) ∈ L+a and νr(x, X) < L−r , then x ∈ POS (νa,νr)(X);
if νa(x, X) < L
+
a and νr(x, X) ∈ L−r , then x ∈ NEG(νa,νr)(X); if x < POS (νa,νr)(X) and x < NEG(νa,νr)(X),
then x ∈ BND(νa,νr)(X). That is, POS (νa,νr)(X) ∪ NEG(νa,νr)(X) ∪ BND(νa,νr)(X) = U and POS (νa,νr)(X) ∩
NEG(νa,νr)(X) = POS (νa,νr)(X) ∩ BND(νa,νr)(X) = NEG(νa,νr)(X) ∩ BND(νa,νr)(X) = ∅. Furthermore, if the
largest element 1 ∈ La, then 1 ∈ L+a ; if the largest element 1 ∈ Lr, then 1 ∈ L−r ; if νa(x, X) a νa(y, X) and
νa(x, X) ∈ L+a for x, y ∈ U and X ⊆ V , then νa(y, X) ∈ L+a ; if νr(x, X) r νr(y, X) and νr(x, X) ∈ L−r for
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x, y ∈ U and X ⊆ V , then νr(y, X) ∈ L−r . For simplicity, we denote ∗C as the complement of the set ∗ in the
following.
Following Definition 3.2, we take the acceptance model (A, A) and the rejection model (R,R) to inter-
pret POS (νa,νr)(X), NEG(νa,νr)(X) and BND(νa,νr)(X). Firstly, we provide the acceptance region POS νa(X)
and the non-acceptance region NPOS νa(X) of the strategy X ⊆ V in (A, A) as follows:
POS νa(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) ∈ L+a } and NPOS νa(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) < L+a }.
For an agent x ∈ U, we get two-way decisions with respect to a strategy X ⊆ V as follows: (A) if
νa(x, X) ∈ L+a , then we take an acceptance action, i.e. x ∈ POS νa(X); (A) if νa(x, X) < L+a , then we take
a non-acceptance action, i.e. x ∈ NPOS νa(X). The acceptance rule (A) puts agents into an acceptance
region, and the non-acceptance rule (A) classifies agents into a non-acceptance region. Secondly, we give
the rejection region NEGνa(X) and the non-rejection region NNEGνa (X) for the strategy X ⊆ V in (R,R)
as follows:
NEGνr(X) = {x ∈ U | νr(x, X) ∈ L−r } and NNEGνr (X) = {x ∈ U | νr(x, X) < L−r }.
For an agent x ∈ U, we obtain two-way decisions with respect to a strategy X ⊆ V as follows: (R) if
νr(x, X) ∈ L−r , then we take a rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NEGνr (X); (R) if νr(x, X) < L−r , then we take a
non-rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NNEGνr(X). The rejection rule (R) classifies agents into a rejection region,
and the non-rejection rule (R) puts agents into a non-rejection region. Thirdly, we have the three-way
decision rules for the agent x ∈ U by combining (A, A) and (R,R) as follows: (P) if νa(x, X) ∈ L+a and
νr(x, X) < L
−
r , then x ∈ POS (νa,νr)(X); (R) if νr(x, X) ∈ L−a and νa(x, X) < L+a , then x ∈ NEG(νa,νr)(X); (B)
if (νa(x, X) ∈ L+a ∧ νr(x, X) ∈ L−r ) or (νa(x, X) < L+a ∧ νr(x, X) < L−r ), then x ∈ BND(νa,νr)(X).
It can be observed that an acceptance decision is interpreted as a combination of acceptance and
non-rejection, i.e., POS (νa,νr)(X) = POS νa(X) ∩ NNEGνr (X); a rejection decision is interpreted as a
combination of rejection and non-acceptance, i.e., NEG(νa,νr)(X) = NEGνr (X) ∩ NPOS νa(X); a non-
commitment decision is interpreted as making an acceptance and a rejection decision simultaneously,
or neither making an acceptance nor making a rejection decision, i.e., BND(νa,νr)(X) = (POS νa(X) ∩
NEGνr (X)) ∪ (NPOS νa(X) ∩ NNEGνr (X)). Especially, we depict the above results by Table 2.
Table 2: Interpretations of POS (νa,νr)(X),NEG(νa,νr)(X) and BND(νa,νr)(X).
(A, A)
(R,R)
νr(x, X) ∈ L−r νr(x, X) < L−r
νa(x, X) ∈ L+a
x ∈ BND(νa,νr)(X) x ∈ POS (νa,νr)(X)
(non-commitment) (acceptance)
νa(x, X) < L
+
a
x ∈ NEG(νa,νr)(X) x ∈ BND(νa,νr)(X)
(rejection) (non-commitment)
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3.2 SMZCAMs for Trisecting the Universe of Agents
In this section, we investigate Sun, Ma and Zhao’s conflict analysis model [25] for dividing agents
into three disjoint blocks.
Suppose U is the universe of agents, V is the universe of issues, and x ∈ U, then the set-valued
mapping f = { f +, f −} is defined as follows:
f + : U → P(V), f +(x) = {c ∈ V | c(x) = +1} and f − : U → P(V), f −(x) = {c ∈ V | c(x) = −1}.
We see that the functions f + and f − are mapping from U to P(V), and f +(x) stands for the issue subset
of the universe V which satisfies the agent x, and the image f −(x) denotes the issue subset of universe V
which are opposed by the agent x. Furthermore, we find that SMZCAMs employ the sets { f +(x) | x ∈ U}
and { f −(x) | x ∈ U} to define the lower and upper approximations of a strategy X ⊆ V as follows:
apr+
f
(X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X}, apr−
f
(X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X},
apr+f (X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ∩ X , ∅}, apr−f (X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ∩ X , ∅}.
Obviously, we observe that the two lower approximations of sets are defined by using set inclusion ⊆,
and the two upper approximations of sets are defined by using set intersection ∩. Furthermore, we take two
equivalence conditions ¬( f +(x) ⊆ XC) and ¬( f −(x) ⊆ XC) to reconstruct the two upper approximations
apr+f (X) and apr
−
f (X) of a strategy X ⊆ V as follows:
apr+f (X) = {x ∈ U | ¬( f +(x) ⊆ XC)}, apr−f (X) = {x ∈ U | ¬( f −(x) ⊆ XC)}.
Definition 3.3 [25] Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, and X ⊆ V a strategy. Then
the agreement, disagreement and neutral subsets POS f (X),NEG f (X) and BND f (X) for X are defined as
follows:
POS f (X) = apr
+
f
(X) − apr−
f
(X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} − {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X};
NEG f (X) = apr
−
f
(X) − apr+
f
(X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} − {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X};
BND f (X) = U − POS f (X) ∪ NEG f (X).
We observe that the agreement subset POS f (X) is equal to the set {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} subtracts the set
{x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X}; the disagreement subset NEG f (X) is equal to the set {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} subtracts
the set {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X}; the neutral subset BND f (X) is equal to the universe U of agents subtracts
the union of POS f (X) and NEG f (X). Furthermore, we find that POS f (X) ∪ NEG f (X) ∪ BND f (X) = U,
POS f (X) ∩ NEG f (X) = POS f (X) ∩ BND f (X) = NEG f (X) ∩ BND f (X) = ∅. That is, we divide the
universe of agents into three disjoint blocks with respect to X.
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Theorem 3.4 Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, and X ⊆ V a strategy. Then we
have
POS f (X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} ∩ {x ∈ U | f −(x) ∩ XC , ∅};
NEG f (X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} ∩ {x ∈ U | f +(x) ∩ XC , ∅};
BND f (X) = POS
C
f (X) ∩ NEGCf (X).
Proof: Since ({x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X})C = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ∩ XC , ∅}, by Definition 3.3, we have
POS f (X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} − {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} ∩ ({x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆
X})C = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} ∩ {x ∈ U | f −(x) ∩ XC , ∅}. Then, since ({x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X})C = {x ∈ U |
f +(x)∩ XC , ∅}, by Definition 3.3, we get NEG f (X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} − {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} = {x ∈
U | f −(x) ⊆ X} ∩ ({x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X})C = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} ∩ {x ∈ U | f +(x) ∩ XC , ∅}. Finally, we
have BND f (X) = U − POS f (X) ∪ NEG f (X) = POSCf (X) ∩ NEGCf (X). 
Theorem 3.4 illustrates the agreement subset POS f (X) is equal to the intersection of {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆
X} and {x ∈ U | f −(x) ∩ XC , ∅}, the disagreement subset NEG f (X) is equal to the intersection of
{x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} and {x ∈ U | f +(x) ∩ XC , ∅}, and the neutral subset BND f (X) is equal to the
intersection of POSC
f
(X) and NEGC
f
(X). Furthermore, for x ∈ POS f (X) and y ∈ NEG f (X), if ci(x) = +1
and c j(y) = −1 for ci, c j ∈ V , then ci ∈ X and c j ∈ X; if ci(x) = −1 for some ci ∈ X, then there exists
c j ∈ XC such that c j(x) = −1; if ci(y) = +1 for some ci ∈ X, then there exists c j ∈ XC such that c j(y) = +1.
Theorem 3.5 Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, and X ⊆ V a strategy. Then we
have
POS f (X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} ∩ {x ∈ U | ¬( f −(x) ⊆ X)};
NEG f (X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} ∩ {x ∈ U | ¬( f +(x) ⊆ X)};
BND f (X) = ({x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} ∩ {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X}) ∪ ({x ∈ U | ¬( f +(x) ⊆ X)} ∩ {x ∈ U | ¬( f −(x) ⊆ X)}).
Proof: It is straightforward by Theorem 3.4. 
Theorem 3.5 illustrates that the agreement subset POS f (X), disagreement subset NEG f (X) and neu-
tral subset BND f (X) of the strategy X are defined uniformly by using the set inclusion. Furthermore, we
study the relationship between Definition 3.2 and Definition 3.3 as follows.
Definition 3.6 Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, La = Lr = {T, F} with F  T,
L+a = L
−
r = {T }, x ∈ U, and X ⊆ V a strategy. Then the acceptance evaluation νa(x, X) and the rejection
evaluation νr(x, X) are defined as follows:
νa(x, X) =
{
T, if f +(x) ⊆ X,
F, if ¬( f +(x) ⊆ X), and νr(x, X) =
{
T, if f −(x) ⊆ XC ,
F, if ¬( f −(x) ⊆ XC).
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We observe that νa(x, X) and νr(x, X) take the value from the set {T, F}. Concretely, if f +(x) ⊆ X,
then νa(x, X) = T ; if f
+(x) * X, then νa(x, X) = F; if f
−(x) ⊆ X, then νr(x, X) = T ; if f −(x) * X,
then νr(x, X) = F. Furthermore, by Theorem 3.5 and Definition 3.6, we reconstruct the agreement,
disagreement and neutral subsets given by Definition 3.3 as follows:
POS f (X) = POS (νa,νr)(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) ∈ L+a ∧ νr(x, X) < L−r };
NEG f (X) = NEG(νa,νr)(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) < L+a ∧ νr(x, X) ∈ L−r };
BND f (X) = BND(νa,νr)(X) = (POS (νa,νr)(X) ∪ NEG(νa,νr)(X))C
= {x ∈ U | (νa(x, X) < L+a ∧ νr(x, X) < L−r ) ∨ (νa(x, X) ∈ L+a ∧ νr(x, X) ∈ L−r )}.
Belows, we employ the acceptance model (A, A) and the rejection model (R,R) to interpret POS f (X),
NEG f (X) and BND f (X). Firstly, we provide the acceptance region POS f +(X) and the non-acceptance
region NPOS f +(X) of the strategy X ⊆ V in (A, A) as follows:
POS f +(X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) ⊆ X} and NPOS f +(X) = {x ∈ U | f +(x) * X}.
For an agent x ∈ U, we have two-way decisions with respect to a strategy X ⊆ V as follows: (A) if
f +(x) ⊆ X, then we take an acceptance action, i.e. x ∈ POS f +(X); (A) if f +(x) * X, then we take a
non-acceptance action, i.e. x ∈ NPOS f +(X). The acceptance rule (A) classifies agents into an acceptance
region, and the non-acceptance rule (A) classifies agents into a non-acceptance region. Secondly, we
provide the rejection region NEG f −(X) and the non-rejection region NNEG f −(X) of the strategy X ⊆ V
in (R,R) as follows:
NEG f −(X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) ⊆ X} and NNEG f − (X) = {x ∈ U | f −(x) * X}.
For an agent x ∈ U, we take two-way decisions with respect to a strategy X ⊆ V as follows: (R) if
f −(x) ⊆ X, then we take a rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NEG f −(X); (R) if f −(x) * X, then we take a
non-rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NNEG f −(X). The rejection rule (R) puts agents into the rejection region,
and the non-rejection rule (R) classifies agents into the non-rejection region. Thirdly, we have the three-
way decision rules for the agent x ∈ U by combining (A, A) and (R,R) as follows: (P) if f +(x) ⊆ X
and f −(x) * X, then x ∈ POS f (X); (R) if f −(x) ⊆ X and f +(x) * X, then x ∈ NEG f (X); (B) if
( f +(x) ⊆ X ∧ f −(x) ⊆ X) or ( f +(x) * X ∧ f −(x) * X), then x ∈ BND f (X).
We see that POS f (X) = POS f +(X) ∩ NNEG f −(X), NEG f (X) = NPOS f +(X) ∩ NEG f − (X) and
BND f (X) = (POS f +(X) ∩ NEG f −(X)) ∪ (NPOS f +(X) ∩ NNEG f −(X)). Meanwhile, we interpret the
three-way decision rules for the agent x ∈ U by Table 3 and illustrate that SMZCAs are special cases of
TWDCAMs given by Definition 3.2.
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Table 3: Interpretations of POS f (X),NEG f (X) and BND f (X).
(A, A)
(R,R)
νr(x, X) = T ∈ L−r νr(x, X) = F < L−r
νa(x, X) = T ∈ L+a
x ∈ BND f (X) x ∈ POS f (X)
(non-commitment) (acceptance)
νa(x, X) = F < L
+
a
x ∈ NEG f (X) x ∈ BND f (X)
(rejection) (non-commitment)
3.3 FQWCAMs for Trisecting the Universe of Agents
In this section, we investigate Fan, Qi and Wei’s conflict analysis model [8] for trisecting the universe
of agents.
Definition 3.7 [8] Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, ([0, 1],≤) a totally ordered
set, X ⊆ V a strategy, D( f +(x) | X) = | f +(x)∩X||X| and D( f −(x) | X) =
| f −(x)∩X|
|X| . Then the functions µa and µr
are defined as follows:
µa : U × P(V) −→ [0, 1], µa(x, X) = D( f +(x) | X) =
| f +(x) ∩ X|
|X| ;
µr : U × P(V) −→ [0, 1], µr(x, X) = D( f −(x) | X) =
| f −(x) ∩ X|
|X| .
The functions µa and µr are mappings from U × P(V) to [0, 1], and µa(x, X) evaluates the extent to
which the agent x accepts the strategy X and µr(x, X) evaluates the extent to which the agent x rejects the
strategy X. Furthermore, if we take La = Lr = [0, 1] and a=r=≤, then µa and µr are special acceptance
and rejection evaluations given by Definition 3.1, respectively.
Definition 3.8 [8] Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, (α, 1] the designated val-
ues for acceptance, (β, 1] the designated values for rejection, and X ⊆ V a strategy. Then we define
the (α, β)−agreement, (α, β)−disagreement and (α, β)−neutral subsets POS (µa,µr)(X), NEG(µa,µr)(X) and
BND(µa,µr)(X) of X as follows:
POS (µa,µr)(X) = {x ∈ U | µa(x, X) ∈ (α, 1] ∧ µr(x, X) < (β, 1]};
NEG(µa,µr)(X) = {x ∈ U | µa(x, X) < (α, 1] ∧ µr(x, X) ∈ (β, 1]};
BND(µa,µr)(X) = U − POS (α,β)(X) ∪ NEG(α,β)(X).
We employ two functions µa(x, X) and µr(x, X) to trisect the universe of agents into POS (µa,µr)(X),
NEG(µa,µr)(X) and BND(µa,µr)(X) with respect to X. Furthermore, if L
+
a = (α, 1], L
+
r = (β, 1], νa(x, X) =
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µa(x, X) =
| f +(x)∩X|
|X| , and νr(x, X) = µr(x, X) =
| f −(x)∩X|
|X| , then we have
POS (µa,µr)(X) = POS (νa,νr)(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) ∈ L+a ∧ νr(x, X) < L−a };
NEG(µa,µr)(X) = NEG(νa,νr)(X) = {x ∈ U | νa(x, X) < L+a ∧ νr(x, X) ∈ L−a };
BND(µa,µr)(X) = BND(νa,νr)(X) = {x ∈ U | (νa(x, X) < L+a ∧ νr(x, X) < L−r ) ∨ (νa(x, X) ∈ L+a ∧ νr(x, X) ∈ L−r )}.
Following Definition 3.8, we interpret POS (µa,µr)(X), NEG(µa,µr)(X) and BND(µa,µr)(X) with the ac-
ceptance model (A, A) and the rejection model (R,R) as follows. Firstly, we provide the acceptance region
POS µa(X) and the non-acceptance region NPOS µa(X) of the strategy X ⊆ V in (A, A) as follows:
POS µa(X) = {x ∈ U | µa(x, X) ∈ (α, 1]} and NPOS µa(X) = {x ∈ U | µa(x, X) < (α, 1]}.
For an agent x ∈ U, we make two-way decisions with respect to a strategy X as follows: (A) if µa(x, X) ∈
(α, 1], then we take an acceptance action, i.e. x ∈ POS µa(X); (A) if µa(x, X) < (α, 1], then we take a
non-acceptance action, i.e. x ∈ NPOS µa(X). The acceptance rule (A) classifies agents into an acceptance
region, and the non-acceptance rule (A) classifies agents into a non-acceptance region. Secondly, we
provide the rejection region NEGµa(X) and the non-rejection region NNEGµa(X) of the strategy X ⊆ V in
(R,R) as follows:
NEGµr (X) = {x ∈ U | µr(x, X) ∈ (β, 1]} and NNEGµr (X) = {x ∈ U | µr(x, X) < (β, 1]}.
For an agent x ∈ U, we derive two-way decisions with respect to a strategy X as follows: (A) if µr(x, X) ∈
(β, 1], then we take a rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NEGµr (X); (A) if µr(x, X) < (β, 1], then we take a non-
rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NNEGµr (X). The rejection rule (R) classifies agents into a rejection region, and
the non-rejection rule (R) puts agents into a non-rejection region. Thirdly, we have the three-way decision
rules for the agent x ∈ U by combining (A, A) and (R,R) as follows: (P) if µa(x, X) ∈ (α, 1] and µr(x, X) <
(β, 1], then x ∈ POS (µa,µr)(X); (R) if µr(x, X) ∈ (β, 1] and µa(x, X) < (α, 1], then x ∈ NEG(µa,µr)(X); (B) if
(µa(x, X) ∈ (α, 1] ∧ µr(x, X) ∈ (β, 1]) or (µa(x, X) < (α, 1] ∧ µr(x, X) < (β, 1]), then x ∈ BND(µa,µr)(X).
We see that POS (µa,µr)(X) = POS µa(X)∩NNEGµr (X), NEG(µa,µr)(X) = NPOS µa(X)∩NEGµr (X) and
BND(µa,µr)(X) = (POS µa(X) ∩ NEGµr(X)) ∪ (NPOS µa(X) ∩ NNEGµr (X)). Furthermore, we depict the
three-way decision rules for the agent x ∈ U by Table 4 and illustrate that FQWCAMs are special cases
of TWDCAMs given by Definition 3.2.
Table 4: Interpretations of POS (µa,µr)(X),NEG(µa,µr)(X) and BND(µa,µr)(X).
(A, A)
(R,R)
µr(x, X) ∈ L−r = (β, 1] µr(x, X) < L−r = (β, 1]
µa(x, X) ∈ L+a = (α, 1]
x ∈ BND(µa,µr)(X) x ∈ POS (µa,µr)(X)
(non-commitment) (acceptance)
µa(x, X) < L
+
a = (α, 1]
x ∈ NEG(µa,µr)(X) x ∈ BND(µa,µr)(X)
(rejection) (non-commitment)
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4 TWDCAMs for Trisecting the Universe of Issues
In this section, we study TWDCAMs for dividing issue sets into three disjoint blocks.
4.1 TWDCAMs II
In this section, we provide another type of TWDCAMs for trisecting the universe of issues.
Definition 4.1 Let U be the universe of agents, and V the universe of issues, (La,a) and (Lr,r) are two
posets. Then a pair of functions ωa : V × P(U) → La and ωr : V × P(U) → Lr is called an acceptance
evaluation and a rejection evaluation of an issue by an agent group, respectively.
For an issue c ∈ V and an agent group Y ⊆ U, we refer to ωa(c, Y) and ωr(c, Y) as the acceptance and
rejection degrees of the issue c by the agent group Y , respectively. For ci, c j ∈ V , if ωa(ci, Y) a ωa(c j, Y),
then ci is less acceptable than c j by Y; if ωr(ci, Y) r ωr(c j, Y), then ci is less rejectable than c j by Y .
Furthermore, if an issue c is accepted by an agent group Y , then ωa(c, Y) must be in a certain subset
L+a ⊆ La, where L+a denotes the acceptance region of La; if an issue c is rejected by an agent group Y , then
ωr(c, Y) must be in a certain subset L
−
r ⊆ Lr, where L−r stands for the rejection region of Lr. For simplicity,
L+a and L
−
r are called the designated values for acceptance and designed values for rejection, respectively.
Definition 4.2 Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, L+a and L
−
r the designated values
for acceptance and designed values for rejection, respectively, ωa and ωr the acceptance evaluation and
rejection evaluation of an issue by an agent group, respectively, and Y ⊆ U an agent group. Then we define
the agreement, disagreement and neutral strategies POS (ωa,ωr)(Y),NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y) and BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) of Y
as follows:
POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) < L−r };
NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) < L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r };
BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) = (POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) ∪ NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y))C
= {c ∈ V | (ωa(c, Y) < L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) < L−r ) ∨ (ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r )}.
For an issue c ∈ V and an agent group Y ⊆ U, if ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a and ωr(c, Y) < L−r , then c ∈
POS (ωa,ωr)(Y); if ωa(c, Y) ∈ L−a and ωr(c, Y) < L+r , then c ∈ NEG(ωa ,ωr)(Y); if c < POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) and c <
NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y), then c ∈ BND(ωa,ωr)(Y). That is, POS (ωa,ωr)(Y)∪NEG(ωa ,ωr)(Y)∪BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) = U and
POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) ∩ NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y) = POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) ∩ BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) = NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y) ∩ BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) = ∅.
Furthermore, if the largest element 1 ∈ La, then 1 ∈ L+a ; if the largest element 1 ∈ Lr, then 1 ∈ L−r ; if
ωa(ci, Y) a ωa(c j, Y) and ωa(ci, Y) ∈ L+a for ci, c j ∈ U and Y ⊆ U, then ωa(c j, Y) ∈ L+a ; if ωr(ci, Y) r
ωr(c j, Y) and ωr(ci, Y) ∈ L−r for ci, c j ∈ V and Y ⊆ U, then ωr(c j, Y) ∈ L−r .
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Following Definition 4.2, we employ the acceptance model (A∗, A∗) and the rejection model (R∗,R∗) to
interpret POS (ωa,ωr)(Y), NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y) and BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) as follows. Firstly, we provide the acceptance
region POSωa(Y) and the non-acceptance region NPOSωa(Y) of the agent group Y ⊆ U in (A∗, A∗) as
follows:
POSωa(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a } and NPOSωa(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) < L+a }.
For an issue c ∈ V , we make two-way decisions with respect to an agent group Y as follows: (A∗) if
ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a , then we take an acceptance action, i.e. c ∈ POSωa(Y); (A∗) if ωa(c, Y) < L+a , then we take
a non-acceptance action, i.e. c ∈ NPOSωa(Y). The acceptance rule (A∗) puts issues into an acceptance
region, and the non-acceptance rule (A∗) classifies issues into a non-acceptance region. Secondly, we give
the rejection region NEGωa(Y) and the non-rejection region NNEGωa (Y) of the agent group Y ⊆ V in
(R∗,R∗) as follows:
NEGωr (Y) = {c ∈ V | ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r } and NNEGωr (Y) = {c ∈ V | ωr(c, Y) < L−r }.
For an issue c ∈ V , we make two-way decisions with respect to an agent group Y as follows: (A∗) if
ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r , then we take a rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NEGωr (Y); (A∗) if ωr(c, Y) < L−r , then we take a
non-rejection action, i.e. x ∈ NNEGωr (Y). The rejection rule (R∗) classifies issues into a rejection region,
and the non-rejection rule (R∗) puts issues into a non-rejection region. Thirdly, we have the three-way
decision rules for the issue c ∈ V by combining (A∗, A∗) and (R∗,R∗) as follows: (P) if ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a and
ωr(c, Y) < L
−
r , then c ∈ POS (ωa,ωr)(Y); (R) if ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−a and ωa(c, Y) < L+a , then c ∈ NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y);
(B) if (ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r ) or (ωa(c, Y) < L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) < L−r ), then c ∈ BND(ωa,ωr)(Y).
Table 5: Interpretations of POS (ωa,ωr)(Y),NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y) and BND(ωa,ωr)(Y).
(A∗, A∗)
(R∗,R∗)
ωa(c, Y) ∈ L−r νa(c, Y) < L−r
ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a
c ∈ BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) c ∈ POS (ωa,ωr)(Y)
(non-commitment) (acceptance)
ωa(c, Y) < L
+
a
c ∈ NEG(ωa ,ωr)(Y) c ∈ BND(ωa,ωr)(Y)
(rejection) (non-commitment)
We observe that POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) = POSωa(Y)∩NNEGωr (Y), NEG(ωa ,ωr)(Y) = NPOSωa(Y)∩NEGωr (Y)
and BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) = (POSωa(Y) ∩ NEGωr (Y)) ∪ (NPOSωa(Y) ∩ NNEGωr (Y)). Furthermore, we depict
the three-way decision rules for the issue c ∈ V by Table 5.
4.2 SMZCAMs for Trisecting the Universe of Issues
In this section, we investigate Sun, Ma and Zhao’s conflict analysis model [25] for dividing issues into
three disjoint blocks.
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Suppose U is the universe of agents, V is the universe of issues, c ∈ V , and Y ⊆ U is an agent group,
then the set-valued mappings g+ and g− is defined as follows:
g+ : V → P(U), g+(c) = {x ∈ U | c(x) = +1} and g− : V → P(U), g−(c) = {x ∈ U | c(x) = −1}.
The functions g+ and g− are mapping from V to P(U), and g+(c) represents the agent subset of the
universe U who support the issue c, and the image g−(c) denotes the agent subset of universe U who
oppose the issue c. Furthermore, we observe that SMZCAMs employ the sets {g+(c) | c ∈ V} and
{g−(c) | c ∈ V} to define the lower and upper approximations of an agent group Y as follows:
apr+
g
(Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y}, apr−
g
(Y) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y},
apr+g (Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ∩ Y , ∅}, apr+g (Y) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ∩ Y , ∅}.
Obviously, we see that the two lower approximations of sets are defined by using the set inclusion ⊆,
and the two upper approximations of sets are defined by using the set intersection ∩. Furthermore, we take
two equivalence conditions ¬(g+(c) ⊆ YC) and ¬(g−(c) ⊆ YC) to reconstruct the upper approximations of
an agent group Y as follows:
apr+g (Y) = {c ∈ V | ¬(g+(c) ⊆ YC)}, apr−g (Y) = {c ∈ V | ¬(g−(c) ⊆ YC)}.
Definition 4.3 [25] Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, and Y ⊆ U an agent
group. Then the agreement, disagreement and neutral strategies POS g(Y), NEGg(Y) and BNDg(Y) of Y
are defined as follows:
POS g(Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} − {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y};
NEGg(Y) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} − {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y};
BNDg(Y) = V − POS g(Y) ∪ NEGg(Y).
We observe that the agreement strategy POS g(Y) is equal to the set {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} subtracts the
set {c ∈ V | g−(x) ⊆ X}; the disagreement strategy NEG f (Y) is equal to {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} subtracts
the set {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y}; the neutral strategy BNDg(Y) is equal to the universe V of issues subtracts
the union of POS g(Y) and NEGg(Y). Furthermore, we have POS g(Y) ∪ NEGg(Y) ∪ BNDg(Y) = V and
POS g(Y)∩NEGg(Y) = POS g(Y)∩BNDg(Y) = NEGg(Y)∩BNDg(Y) = ∅. That is, we divide the universe
of issues into three disjoint blocks with respect to Y .
Theorem 4.4 Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, and Y ⊆ U a strategy. Then we
have
POS g(Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ {c ∈ V | g−(c) ∩ YC , ∅};
NEGg(Y) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ {c ∈ V | g+(c) ∩ YC , ∅};
BNDg(Y) = POS
C
g (Y) ∩ NEGCg (Y).
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Proof: Since ({c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y})C = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ∩ YC , ∅}, by Definition 4.3, we have
POS g(Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} − {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ ({c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y})C =
{c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ {c ∈ V | g−(c) ∩ YC , ∅}. Furthermore, since ({c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y})C = {c ∈ V |
g+(c) ∩ YC , ∅}, by Definition 4.3, we have NEGg(Y) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} − {x ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} = {c ∈
U | g−(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ ({c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y})C = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ {c ∈ V | g+(c)∩ YC , ∅}. Finally, we have
BNDg(Y) = V − POS g(Y) ∪ NEGg(Y) = (POS g(Y) ∪ NEGg(Y))C = POSCg (Y) ∩ NEGCg (Y). 
Theorem 4.4 illustrates that the agreement strategy POS g(Y) is equal to the intersection of {c ∈ V |
g+(c) ⊆ Y} and {c ∈ V | g−(c) ∩ YC , ∅}, the disagreement strategy NEGg(Y) is equal to the intersection
of {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} and {c ∈ V | g+(c) ∩ YC , ∅}, and the neutral strategy BNDg(Y) is equal to the
intersection of POSCg (Y) and NEG
C
g (Y). Furthermore, if ci(x) = +1 and c j(x) = −1 for ci ∈ POS g(Y) and
c j ∈ NEGg(Y), then x ∈ YC ; if ci(x) = −1 for c ∈ POS g(Y) and some x ∈ Y , then there exists y ∈ YC
such that ci(x) = −1; if c j(x) = +1 for c j ∈ NEGg(Y) and some x ∈ Y , then there exists y ∈ YC such that
c j(x) = +1.
Theorem 4.5 Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, and Y ⊆ U an agent group. Then
we have
POS g(Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ {c ∈ V | ¬(g−(c) ⊆ Y)};
NEGg(Y) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ {c ∈ V | ¬(g+(c) ⊆ Y)};
BNDg(Y) = ({c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} ∩ {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y}) ∪ ({c ∈ V | ¬(g+(c) ⊆ Y)} ∩ {c ∈ V | ¬(g−(c) ⊆ Y)}).
Proof: It is straightforward by Theorem 4.4. 
Theorem 4.5 illustrates that the agreement, disagreement and neutral strategies of the agent group Y
are defined uniformly by using the set inclusion. Concretely, for Y ⊆ U and c ∈ V , if g+(c) ⊆ Y and
¬(g−(c) ⊆ Y), then c ∈ POS g(Y); if ¬(g+(c) ⊆ Y) and g−(c) ⊆ Y , then c ∈ NEGg(Y); if g+(c) ⊆ Y and
g−(c) ⊆ Y , then c ∈ BNDg(Y); if ¬(g+(c) ⊆ Y) and ¬(g−(c) ⊆ Y), then c ∈ BNDg(Y).
Suppose U is the universe of agents, V is the universe of issues, La = Lr = {F, T } with F  T ,
L+a = L
−
r = {T }, c ∈ V , and Y ⊆ U is an agent group. Then the acceptance evaluation ωr(c, Y) and the
rejection evaluation ωr(c, Y) are defined as follows:
ωa(c, Y) =
{
T, if g+(c) ⊆ Y,
F, if ¬(g+(c) ⊆ Y), ωr(c, Y) =
{
T, if g−(c) ⊆ YC,
F, if ¬(g−(c) ⊆ YC).
Furthermore, by Theorem 4.5, we have the results by using ωr(c, Y) and ωr(c, Y) as follows:
POS g(X) = POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) < L−r };
NEGg(Y) = NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) < L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r };
BNDg(Y) = BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) = (POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) ∪ NEG(ωa,ωr)(Y))C
= {c ∈ V | (ωa(c, Y) < L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) < L−r ) ∨ (ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r )}.
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Belows, we employ the acceptance model (A∗, A∗) and the rejection model (R∗,R∗) to interpret POS g(X),
NEGg(X) and BNDg(X). Firstly, we provide the acceptance region POS g+(Y) and the non-acceptance re-
gion NPOS g+(Y) of the agent group Y ⊆ U in (A∗, A∗) as follows:
POS g+(Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) ⊆ Y} and NPOS g+(Y) = {c ∈ V | g+(c) * Y}.
For an issue c ∈ V , we have two-way decisions with respect to an agent group Y as follows: (A∗) if
g+(c) ⊆ Y , then we take an acceptance action, i.e. c ∈ POS g+(Y); (A∗) if g+(c) * Y , then we take a non-
acceptance action, i.e. c ∈ NPOS g+(Y). The acceptance rule (A∗) puts issues into an acceptance region,
and the non-acceptance rule (A∗) classifies issues into a non-acceptance region. Secondly, we provide the
rejection region NEGg−(Y) and the non-rejection region NNEGg−(Y) of the agent group Y ⊆ U in (R∗,R∗)
as follows:
NEGg−(Y) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) ⊆ Y} and NNEGg− (X) = {c ∈ V | g−(c) * Y}.
For an issue c ∈ V , we make two-way decisions with respect to an agent group Y as follows: (R∗) if
g−(c) ⊆ Y , then we take a rejection action, i.e. c ∈ NEGg−(Y); (R∗) if g−(c) * Y , then we take a non-
rejection action, i.e. c ∈ NNEGg− (y). The rejection rule (R∗) classifies issues into a rejection region, and
the non-rejection rule (R∗) puts issues into a non-rejection region. Thirdly, we have the three-way decision
rules for the issue c ∈ V by combining (A∗, A∗) and (R∗,R∗) as follows: (P) if g+(c) ⊆ Y and g−(c) * Y ,
then c ∈ POS g(Y); (R) if g−(c) ⊆ Y and g+(c) * Y , then c ∈ NEGg(Y); (B) if (g+(c) ⊆ Y ∧ g−(c) ⊆ Y) or
(g+(c) * Y ∧ g−(c) * Y), then c ∈ BNDg(Y).
We see that POS g(Y) = POS g+(Y)∩NNEGg− (Y), NEGg(Y) = NPOS g+(Y)∩NEGg− (Y) and BNDg(Y) =
(POS g+(Y) ∩ NEGg− (Y)) ∪ (NPOS g+ (Y) ∩ NNEGg− (Y)). Meanwhile, we depict the three-way decision
rules for the issue c ∈ V by Table 6 and illustrate that SMZCAs are special cases of TWDCAMs given by
Definition 4.2.
Table 6: Interpretations of POS g(Y),NEGg(Y) and BNDg(Y).
(A∗, A∗)
(R∗,R∗)
ωa(c, Y) = T ∈ L−r ωa(c, Y) = F < L−r
ωa(c, Y) = T ∈ L+a
c ∈ BNDg(Y) c ∈ POS g(Y)
(non-commitment) (acceptance)
ωa(c, Y) = F < L
+
a
c ∈ NEGg(Y) c ∈ BNDg(Y)
(rejection) (non-commitment)
4.3 FQWCAMs for Trisecting the Universe of Issues
In this section, we investigate Fan, Qi and Wei’s conflict analysis model [8] for dividing issue sets into
three disjoint blocks.
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Suppose U is the universe of agents, V is the universe of issues, ([0, 1],≤) is a totally ordered set,
Y ⊆ U is an agent group, D(g+(c) | Y) = |g+(c)∩Y ||Y | and D(g−(c) | Y) =
|g−(c)∩Y |
|Y | . Then the functions ψa and
ψr are defined as follows:
ψa : U × P(V) −→ [0, 1], ψa(c, Y) = D(g+(c) | Y) =
|g+(c) ∩ Y |
|Y | ;
ψr : U × P(V) −→ [0, 1], ψr(c, Y) = D(g−(c) | Y) =
|g−(c) ∩ Y |
|Y | .
The functions ψa and ψr are mappings from V × P(U) to [0, 1], and ψa(c, Y) evaluates the extent to
which the agent group Y accepts the issue c and ψr(c, Y) evaluates the extent to which the agent group Y
rejects the issue c. Furthermore, if we take La = Lr = [0, 1] and a=r=≤, then the functions ψa and ψr
are special acceptance evaluation and rejection evaluation given by Definition 4.1, respectively.
Definition 4.6 [8] Let U be the universe of agents, V the universe of issues, (α, 1] the designated
values for acceptance, (β, 1] the designated values for rejection, and Y ⊆ U an agent group. Then
the (α, β)−agreement, (α, β)−disagreement and (α, β)−neutral strategies POS (α,β)(Y), NEG(α,β)(Y) and
BND(α,β)(Y) of Y are defined as follows:
POS (ψa,ψr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ψa(c, Y) ∈ (α, 1] ∧ ψr(c, Y) < (β, 1]};
NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ψa(c, Y) < (α, 1] ∧ ψr(c, Y) ∈ (β, 1]};
BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) = V − POS (ψa,ψr)(Y) ∪ NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y).
We employ two functions ψa(c, Y) and ψr(c, Y) to trisect the universe of issues into POS (ψa,ψr)(Y),
NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y) and BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) with respect to Y . Especially, we have POS (ψa,ψr)(Y) ∪ NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y) ∪
BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) = U and POS (ψa,ψr)(Y)∩NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y) = POS (ψa,ψr)(Y)∩BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) = NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y)∩
BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) = ∅. Furthermore, if L+a = (α, 1], L+r = (β, 1], ψa(c, Y) = |g
+(c)∩Y |
|Y | , and ψr(c, Y) =
|g−(c)∩Y |
|Y | ,
then we have
POS (ψa,ψr))(Y) = POS (ωa,ωr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) < L−a };
NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y) = NEG(ωa ,ωr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | ωa(c, Y) < L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−a };
BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) = BND(ωa,ωr)(Y) = {c ∈ V | (ωa(c, Y) < L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) < L−r ) ∨ (ωa(c, Y) ∈ L+a ∧ ωr(c, Y) ∈ L−r )}.
Belows, we take the acceptance model (A∗, A∗) and the rejection model (R∗,R∗) to interpret POS (ψa,ψr)(Y),
NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y) and BND(ψa,ψr)(Y). Firstly, we provide the acceptance region POS ψa(Y) and the non-
acceptance region NPOS ψa(Y) of the agent group Y ⊆ U in (A∗, A∗) as follows:
POS ψa(Y) = {c ∈ V | ψa(c, Y) ∈ (α, 1]} and NPOS ψa(X) = {c ∈ V | ψa(c, Y) < (α, 1]}.
For an issue c ∈ V , we make two-way decisions with respect to an agent group Y as follows: (A∗) if
ψa(c, Y) ∈ (α, 1], then take an acceptance action, i.e. c ∈ POS ψa(Y); (A∗) if ψa(c, Y) < (α, 1], then take a
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non-acceptance action, i.e. c ∈ NPOS ψa(Y). The acceptance rule (A∗) classifies issues into an acceptance
region, and the non-acceptance rule (A∗) puts issues into a non-acceptance region. Secondly, we give the
rejection region NEGψa (Y) and the non-rejection region NNEGψa(Y) of the agent group Y ⊆ U in (R∗,R∗)
as follows:
NEGψr (Y) = {c ∈ V | ψr(x, Y) ∈ (β, 1]} and NNEGψr (Y) = {c ∈ V | ψr(x, Y) < (β, 1]}.
For an issue c ∈ V , we make two-way decisions with respect to an agent group Y as follows: (A) if
ψr(c, Y) ∈ (β, 1], then we take a rejection action, i.e. c ∈ NEGψr (Y); (A) if ψr(c, Y) < (β, 1], then we
take a non-rejection action, i.e. c ∈ NNEGψr (Y). The rejection rule (R∗) puts issues into an rejection
region, and the non-rejection rule (R∗) classifies issues into a non-rejection region. Thirdly, we have
the three-way decision rules for the issue c ∈ V by combining (A∗, A∗) and (R∗,R∗) as follows: (P) if
ψa(c, Y) ∈ (α, 1] and ψr(c, Y) < (β, 1], then x ∈ POS (ψa,ψr)(Y); (R) if ψr(c, Y) ∈ (β, 1] and ψa(c, Y) < (α, 1],
then c ∈ NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y); (B) if (ψa(c, Y) ∈ (α, 1]∧ψr(c, Y) ∈ (β, 1]) or (ψa(c, Y) < (α, 1]∧ψr(c, Y) < (β, 1]),
then c ∈ BND(ψa,ψr)(Y).
Table 7: Interpretations of POS (ψa,ψr)(Y),NEG(ψa,ψr)(Y) and BND(ψa,ψr)(Y).
(A∗, A∗)
(R∗,R∗)
ψr(c, Y) ∈ L−r = (β, 1] ψr(c, Y) < L−r = (β, 1]
ψa(c, Y) ∈ L+a = (α, 1]
c ∈ BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) c ∈ POS (ψa,ψr)(Y)
(non-commitment) (acceptance)
ψa(c, Y) < L
+
a = (α, 1]
c ∈ NEG(ψa ,ψr)(Y) c ∈ BND(ψa,ψr)(Y)
(rejection) (non-commitment)
We observe that POS (ψa,ψr)(Y) = POS ψa(Y)∩NNEGψr (Y), NEG(ψa ,ψr)(Y) = NPOS ψa(Y)∩NEGψr (Y)
and BND(ψa,ψr)(Y) = (POS ψa(Y)∩ NEGψr (Y))∪ (NPOS ψa (Y)∩ NNEGψr (Y)). Meanwhile, we depict the
three-way decision rules for the issue c ∈ V by Table 7 and illustrate that FQWCAs are special cases of
TWDCAMs given by Definition 4.2.
5 The relationship among TWDCAMs, FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs
In this section, we investigate the relationship among TWDCAMs, FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs.
On one hand, there are three types of conflict analysis models TWDCAMs, FQWCAMs and SMZ-
CAMs for trisecting the universes of agents and issues, and six conflict analysis models are given by
Definitions 3.2, 3.3, 3.8, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.6 in Sections 3 and 4. Concretely, we employ Definitions 3.2,
3.3 and 3.8 to divide the universe of agents into three disjoint blocks; we apply Definitions 4.2, 4.3 and
4.6 to trisect the universe of issues. Especially, Definitions 3.3 and 3.8 are special cases of Definition
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3.2; Definitions 4.3 and 4.6 are special cases of Definition 4.2. Therefore, we classify the six con-
flict analysis models into two categories as follows: {Definition 3.2, Definition 3.3, Definition 3.8} and
{Definition 4.2, Definition 4.3, Definition 4.6}, which are depicted by Table 8, where √ denotes that the
conflict analysis model satisfies the property in the column.
Table 8: Classification of Six Conflict Analysis Models
Divide Agents Divide Issues Qualitative Models Quantitative Models
Definition 3.2
√ √
Definition 3.3
√ √
Definition 3.8
√ √
Definition 4.2
√ √
Definition 4.3
√ √
Definition 4.6
√ √
On the other hand, the conflict analysis models given by Definitions 3.2 and 4.2 employ two evaluation
functions to construct the agreement, disagreement and neutral subsets of a strategy and the agreement,
disagreement and neutral strategies of an agent group, respectively; the conflict analysis models given by
3.3 and 4.3 apply the set inclusion to define the agreement, disagreement and neutral subsets of a strategy
and the agreement, disagreement and neutral strategies of an agent group, respectively; the conflict analy-
sis models given by Definitions 3.8 and 4.6 take the including degree function to construct the agreement,
disagreement and neutral subsets of a strategy and the agreement, disagreement and neutral strategies of
an agent group, respectively. Furthermore, the set inclusion and including degree function are considered
as special cases of the evaluation functions, and Definitions 3.2 and 4.2 are generalizations of Definitions
3.3 and 3.8 and Definitions 4.3 and 4.6, respectively. Especially, the conflict analysis models given by
Definitions 3.3 and 4.3 are qualitative models, and the conflict analysis models given by Definitions 3.8
and 4.6 are quantitative models, which are depicted by Table 8, where
√
denotes that the conflict analysis
model satisfies the property in the column.
6 Conclusions
Three-way decision theory is a powerful mathematical tool for handling uncertainty in conflict anal-
ysis decision making problems. In this paper, we have provided a type of TWDCAMs for trisecting the
universe of agents and employed a pair of two-way decisions models to interpret the three-way decisions
rules of an agent. Moreover, we have established another type of TWDCAMs for trisecting the universe of
issues and interpreted the three-way decisions rules of an issue with a couple of two-way decisions mod-
els. Finally, we have interpreted FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs with a pair of two-day decisions models
and illustrated that FQWCAMs and SMZCAMs are special cases of TWDCAMs.
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In the future, we will study how to provide the designated values for acceptance and designed values
for rejection, and provide effective algorithms for trisecting the universes of agents and issues. Further-
more, there are a lot of dynamic situation tables in practical situations, and we will investigate how to
trisect the universes of agents and issues in dynamic situation tables.
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